He explains that he uses the word 'suggestion'in order to avoid the hypothesis that the sequence of two ideas necessarily implies a previous state of mind in which they were brought together;and endeavours to explain various cases (as,for example,association by 'contrast'as well as by 'likeness'or 'continuity')by a more 'subtile'analysis.28He then works out an elaborate theory of 'simple'and 'relative'suggestion.Simple 'suggestion'29corresponds mainly to ordinary association,as when a friend's name or his book calls up the thought of the man himself.'Relative suggestion'arises when two or more objects are perceived and suggest various relations of likeness and so forth.30This provides a scheme for working out the whole doctrine of the sequences of ideas so far as the sequences depend upon the mind itself and not upon external causes.It thus leads to problems of abstraction and generalisation and to his whole theory of what he calls the 'intellectual states.'He again closely coincides with the French ideologists.He starts by examining Locke and Condillac.He of course professes to hold that Condillac's version of Locke is illegitimate,and ridicules the famous formula penser c'est sentir.He is,however,equally unwilling to admit Reid's 'variety of powers.'31In fact,his criticism of Condillac shows more affinity than contrast.Condillac erred,he says,in holding that thoughts are 'transformed sensations.'This was a false simplification into which he considers Condillac to have been led partly by the ambiguity of the word sentir.32Condillac applied to the mind the theory,true in 'the chemistry of the material chemists,'that the 'compounds are the elements themselves.'33He errs when he infers from the analogy that a feeling which arises out of others can be resolved into them.'Love and hate'and other emotions are fundamentally different from the sensations by which they are occasioned,not mere 'transformations'of those sensations.We,on the other hand (that is to say,Reid and Stewart),have erred by excessive amplification.Instead of identifying different things,we have admitted a superfluous number of 'ultimate principles.'
The result is that besides the original sensations,we have to consider a number of feelings,which,while essentially different,are 'suggested'or caused by them.These are parts of the whole intellectual construction,and,though not transformed sensations,are still 'feelings'arising in consequence of the sensations.
They are parts of the 'trains'or sequences of 'ideas.'It is accordingly characteristic of Brown that he habitually describes an intellectual process as a 'feeling,'the statement of a mathematical proportion,for example,is a case of 'relative suggestion.'When we consider two numbers together we have a 'feeling of the relation of proportion.'34The 'profoundest reasonings'are 'nothing more than a continued analysis of our thought,'by which we resolve the 'complex feelings of our minds'into the simpler conceptions out of which they were constructed.35In other words,Brown,it would seem,really accepts the penser c'est sentir,only that he regards the sentir as including separate classes of feeling,which cannot be regarded as simple 'transformations'of sensation.They are 'states of the mind'caused by,that is,invariably following upon,the simpler states,and,of course,combining in an endless variety of different forms.
Reasoning is nothing more than a series of relative 'suggestions of which the separate subjects are felt by us to be mutually related.'36Hence,too,arises his theory of generalisation.He is,he says,not a 'nominalist'but a 'conceptualist,'and here,for once,agrees with Reid as against Stewart.37The 'general term,'according to him,expresses the 'feeling or general notion of resemblance,'which arises upon a contemplation of two objects.'In Nature,'as he observes elsewhere,38'there are no classes,'but the observation of a number of particular cases and a certain feeling to which we give a name.Here,again,Brown's view coincides with that of his French contemporaries.
We may then say briefly that Brown carries out in his own fashion the conception of psychology which makes it an inductive science parallel to the physical sciences,and to be pursued by the same methods.We have to do with 'feelings'instead of atoms,and with mental instead of 'material'chemistry.Our sole method is still an analysis such as guides us in unravelling complex physical phenomena.We have,indeed,to admit certain first truths --the belief in our own identity is one of them --which are necessary to our very existence,although the assertion of such principles was carried to an extravagant and ridiculous length 'by Reid and some of his friends.'When,however,we come to ask what these principles are,it must be admitted that they are very innocent.They are not dangerous things,like 'innate ideas,'capable of leading us to a transcendental world,but simply assertions that we are warranted in trusting our sensations and applying a thoroughly inductive and empirical method.They are the cement which joins the feelings,and which,as Mill thought,could be supplanted by 'indissoluble associations.'