To constitute an empirical science is to show that the difference between different phenomena is due simply to 'circumstances.'The explanation of the facts becomes sufficient when the 'law'can be stated,as that of a unit of constant properties placed in varying positions.This corresponds to the procedure in the physical sciences,where the Ultimate aim is to represent all laws as corresponding to the changes of position of uniform atoms.In social and political changes the goal is the same.J.S.Mill states in the end of his Autobiography (103)that one main purpose of his writing was to show that 'differences between individuals,races,or sexes'are due to 'differences in circumstances.'In fact,this is an aim so characteristic from the beginning of the whole school,that it may be put down almost as a primary postulate.It was not,indeed,definitely formulated;but to 'explain'a social theorem was taken to be the same thing as to show how differences of character or conduct could be explained by 'circumstance'--meaning by 'circumstance'something not given in the agent himself.We have,however,no more right as good empiricists to assert than to deny that all difference comes from 'circumstance.'If we take 'man'as a constant quantity in our speculations,it requires at least a great many precautions before we can assume that our abstract entity corresponds to a real concrete unit.Otherwise we have a short cut to a doctrine of 'equality.'The theory of 'the rights of man'lays down the formula,and assumes that the facts will correspond.
The Utilitarian assumes the equality of fact,and of course brings out an equally absolute formula.'Equality,'in some sense,is introduced by a side wind,though not explicitly laid down as an axiom.(104)This underlying tendency may partly explain the coincidence of results --though it would require a good many qualifications in detail;but here I need only take Bentham's more or less unconscious application.
Bentham's tacit assumption,in fact,is that there is an average 'man.'
Different specimens of the race,indeed,may vary widely according to age,sex,and so forth;but,for purposes of legislation,he may serve as a unit.
We can assume that he has on the average certain qualities from which his actions in the mass can be determined with sufficient accuracy,and we are tempted to assume that they are mainly the qualities obvious to an inhabitant of Queen's Square Place about the year 1800.Mill defends Bentham against the charge that he assumed his codes to be good for all men everywhere.To that,says Mill,(105)the essay upon the 'Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation'is a complete answer.Yet Mill (016)admits in the same breath that Bentham omitted all reference to 'national character.'In fact,as we have seen,Bentham was ready to legislate for Hindoostan as well as for his own parish;and to make codes not only for England,Spain,and Russia,but for Morocco.The Essay mentioned really explains the point.Bentham not only admitted but asserted as energetically as became an empiricist,that we must allow for 'circumstances';and circumstances include not only climate and so forth,but the varying beliefs and customs of the people under consideration.The real assumption is that all such circumstances are superficial,and can be controlled and altered indefinitely by the 'legislator.'The Moor,the Hindoo,and the Englishman are all radically identical;and the differences which must be taken into account for the moment can be removed by judicious means.Without pausing to illustrate this from the Essay,I may remark that for many purposes such an assumption is justifiable and guides ordinary common sense.If we ask what would be the best constitution for a commercial company,or the best platform for a political party,we can form a fair guess by arguing from the average of Bentham and his contemporaries --especially if we are shrewd attorneys or political wirepullers.Only we are not therefore in a position to talk about the 'science of human nature'or to deal with problems of 'sociology.'This,however,gives Bentham's 'individualism'in a sense of the phrase already explained.He starts from the 'ready-made man,'and deduces all institutions or legal arrangements from his properties.I have tried to show how naturally this view fell in with the ordinary political conceptions of the time.It shows,again,why Bentham disregards history.
When we have such a science,empirical or a priori,history is at most of secondary importance.We can deduce all our maxims of conduct from the man himself as he is before us.History only shows how terribly he blundered in the pre-scientific period.The blunders may give us a hint here and there.
Man was essentially the same in the first and the eighteenth century,and the differences are due to the clumsy devices which he made by rule of thumb.