Bentham admits this in his own fashion.If 'motives'cannot be properly called good or bad,is there,he asks,nothing good or bad in the man who on a given occasion obeys a certain motive?'Yes,certainly,'he replies,'his disposition.'(46)The disposition,he adds,is a 'fictitious entity,and designed for the convenience of discourse in order to express what there is supposed to be permanent in a man's frame of mind.'By 'fictitious,'as we have seen,he means not 'unreal'but simply not tangible,weighable,or measurable-like sticks and stones,or like pains and pleasures.'Fictitious'as they may be,therefore,the fiction enables us to express real truths,and to state facts which are of the highest importance to the moralist and the legislator.Bentham discusses some cases of casuistry in order to show the relation between the tendency of an action and the intention and motives of the agent.Ravaillac murders a good king;Ravaillac's son enables his father to escape punishment,or conveys poison to his father to enable him to avoid torture by suicide.(47)What is the inference as to the son's disposition in either case?The solution (as he substantially and,I think,rightly suggests)will have to be reached by considering whether the facts indicate that the son's disposition was mischievous or otherwise;whether it indicates political disloyalty or filial affection,and so forth,and in what proportions.The most interesting case perhaps is that of religious persecution,where the religious motive is taken to be good,and the action to which it leads is yet admitted to be mischievous.The problem is often puzzling,but we are virtually making an inference as to the goodness or badness of the 'disposition'implied by the given action under all the supposed circumstances.This gives what Bentham calls the 'meritoriousness'(48)of the disposition.The 'intention'is caused by the 'motive.'The 'disposition'is the 'sum of the intentions';that is to say,it expresses the agent's sensibility to various classes of motives;and the merit therefore will be in proportion to the total goodness or badness of the disposition thus indicated.The question of merit leads to interesting moral problems.Bentham,however,observes that he is not here speaking from the point of view of the moralist but of the legislator.
Still,as a legislator he has to consider what is the 'depravity'of disposition indicated by different kinds of conduct.This consideration is of great importance.
The 'disposition'includes sensibility to what he calls 'tutelary motives'motives,that is,which deter a man from such conduct as generally produces mischievous consequences.No motive can be invariably,though some,especially the motive of goodwill,and in a minor degree those of 'amity'and a 'love of reputation,'are generally,on the right side.The legislator has to reinforce these 'tutelary motives'by 'artificial tutelary motives,'and mainly by appealing to the 'love of ease,'that is,by making mischievous conduct more difficult,and to 'self-preservation,'that is,by making it more dangerous.(49)He has therefore to measure the force by which these motives will be opposed;or,in other words,the 'strength of the temptation.'Now the more depraved a man's disposition,the weaker the temptation which will seduce him to crime.
Consequently if an act shows depravity,it will require a stronger counter-motive or a more severe punishment,as the disposition indicated is more mischievous.
An act,for example,which implies deliberation proves a greater insensibility to these social motives which,as Bentham remarks,(50)determine the 'general tenor of a man's life,'however depraved he may be.The legislator is guided solely by 'utility,'or aims at maximising happiness without reference to its quality.Still,so far as action implies disposition,he has to cOnsider the depravity as a source of mischief.The legislator who looks solely at the moral quality implied is wrong;and,if guided solely by his sympathies,has no measure for the amount of punishment to be inflicted.These considerations will enable us to see what is the proper measure of resentment.(51)The doctrine of the neutrality or 'unmorality'of motive is thus sufficiently clear.Bentham's whole aim is to urge that the criterion of morality is given by the consequences of actions.To say the conduct is good or bad is to say in other words that it produces a balance of pleasure or pain.To make the criterion independent,or escape the vicious circle,we must admit the pleasures and pains to be in themselves neutral;to have,that is,the same value,if equally strong,whatever their source.In our final balance-sheet we must set down pains of illwill and of goodwill,of sense and of intellect with absolute impartiality,and compare them simply in respect of intensity.We must not admit a 'conscience'or 'moral sense'which would be autocratic;nor,indeed,allow moral to have any meaning as applied to the separate passions.
But it is quite consistent with this to admit that some motives,goodwill in particular,generally tend to bring out the desirable result,that is,a balance of pleasure for the greatest number.The pains and pleasures are the ultimate facts,and the 'disposition'is a 'fictitious entity'or a name for the sum of sensibilities.It represents the fact that some men are more inclined than others to increase the total of good or bad.