It should also be noted that in speaking of the intrinsic principle, namely, matter and form, there is an agreement and difference of principles according to the agreement and difference of what results from the principles.For certain things are numerically the same, such as Socrates and this man (in pointing at Socrates).Other things are numerically diverse but the same in species, such as Socrates and Plato, who although they agree as men (human species)nevertheless, differ by number.Also certain things differ according to species but we are the same according to genus; for example, man and ass are both in the genus animal.Again certain things are diverse in genus but are the same only according to analogy; such as substance and quantity, which do not agree in any genus but which are brought together only according to analogy.For they are found together only in that which is being; being, however is not a genus, since it is not predicated univocally, but analogously.
In order to understand this, however, it should be known that something is predicated of many in three ways: univocally, equivocally and analogously.A univocal predication occurs when one thing is predicated according to the same name and according to the same nature, that is, the same definition, as "animal"is predicated of "man" and "ass".For both of these are called "animal"and each of them is a living substance capable of sensation, which is the definition of animal.Equivocal predication occurs when something is predicated of others according to the same name and according to different natures, as "dog" is said of a "barking animal" and a "steller constellation", which things agree only in name and not in definition or signification; for that which is signified by the name is the definition, as is said in Bk.IVof the Metaphysics.An analogical predication occurs when one thing is predicated of many, which are of different natures, but of which one some thing is attributed to them, as "healthy" is said of the "animal body", and of "urine", and of the "medicine" but "healthy" does not signify exactly the same thing in all of them.For "healthy" is said of "urine" as of a sign of good health, of "the body", as of its subject, of "the medicine"as of a cause.Nevertheless, all of these natures are attributed to a one end, namely, health.For sometimes those things which are brought together according to analogy, that is in proportion, or comparison, or agreement, are attributed to one end, as is evident in the above example; sometimes in one agent, as "doctor" is said both of one who operates through art and of one who operates without art, such as the midwife--and the same also holds for instruments, but through attribution to a one agent which is the art of medicine.Also sometimes the analogy is based through attribution to a one subject as when "being" is said of substance and of quantity and of quality, and of the other predicaments.For it is not for exactly the same reason that substance is said of being, and quantity, and the others--but all of them are called being by the fact that they are attributed to substance, which is the subject of the others.And, therefore, being is said primarily of substance and secondarily of the others.Accordingly, being is not the genus of substance and quantity because no genus is predicated primarily and secondarily of its species.Being is predicated analogously.And it is in this light that we say that substance and quantity differ in genus, but are the same according to analogy.
Wherefore, of those things which are numerically one, both the form and the matter are numerically one, as in the case of Tullius and of Cicero.Moreover, of those things which are the same specifically, but differ by number, both the matter and the form are not the same numerically but specifically as in the case of Socrates and of Plato.And similarly, of those things which are the same generically, their principles are generically the same, as in the case of the soul and the body of an ass and of a horse which differ specifically but are the same generically.And it is also similar for those things which agree only according to analogy, for their principles are similar only according to analogy or proportion.For matter, form, and privation, or potency and act are principles of substance and of the other genera.Nevertheless, the matter of substance and of quantity (and similarity with respect to form and privation) differ generically, but agree only according to a proportion which consists in this--just as the matter of substance is related to substance in the nature of matter, so is the matter of quantity related to quantity.However, just as substance is the cause of all the other genera, so the principles of substance are the principles of all the other genera.
The End