The basis of all sentiment of this kind is the sense of community， or of sharing in a common social or spiritual whole， membership in which gives to all a kind of inner equality， no matter what their special parts may be. It is felt， however， that the differences among men should be (181) functional and intrinsic， not arbitrary or accidental. The sense of justice is usually strong among the members of a sympathetic group， the basis for determining what is just being the perception of some purpose which every one is to serve， each in his own way， so that he who rightly holds a higher place is the one who can function best for the common good.
It does not hurt my self-respect or my allegiance to remain a common seaman while another becomes captain of the ship， provided I recognize that he is the fitter man for the place； and if the distribution of stations in society were evidently of this sort there would be no serious protest against it. What makes trouble is the growth of an ideal of fair play which the actual system of things does not satisfy.
The widening of sympathy and the consciousness of larger unity have brought the hope and demand for a corresponding extension of justice； and all sorts of humanity梟ot to speak of the lower animals梡rofit by this wider sentiment. Classes seek to understand each other； the personality of women and children is recognized and fostered； there is some attempt to sympathize with alien nations and races， civilized or savage， and to help them to their just place in the common life of mankind.
Our conception of international rights reflects the same view， and the American， at least， desires that his country should treat other countries as one just man treats another， and is proud when he can believe that she has done so. It is surely of scme significance that in the most powerful of democracies national selfishness， in the judgment of a competent European observer， (182) is less cynical and obtrusive than in any of the great states of Europe. [2]
Truth is a kind of justice， and wherever there is identification of onself with the life of the group it is fostered， and lying tends to be felt as mean and impolitic. Serious falsehood among friends is， I believe， universally abhorred 梑y savages and children as well as by civilized adults.
To lie to a friend is to hit him from behind， to trip him up in the dark， and so the moral sentiment of every group attempts to suppress falsehood among its members， however it may be encouraged as against outsiders. "Wherefore，"says St. Paul， "putting away lying， speak every man truth with his neighbor， for we are members one of another." [3]
Our democratic system aims to be a larger organization of moral unity， and so far as it is so， in the feeling of the individual， it fosters this open and downright attitude toward his fellows. In idea， and largely in fact， we are a commonwealth， of which each one is a member by his will and intelligence， as well as by necessity， and with which， accordingly， the human sentiment of loyalty among those who are members one of another is naturally in force. The very disgust with which， in a matter like assessment for taxation， men contemplate the incompatibility that sometimes exists between truth and fairness， is a tribute to the prevailing sentiment of sincerity.
An artificial system， that is one which， however solid (183) its hidden foundations梐nd of course all systems rest on fact of some sort梔oes not visibly flow from principles of truth and fairness， fails to arouse this loyalty of partnership. One may be devoted to it， but his devotion will be based rather on reverence for something above him than on a sense of participation， and will call for submission rather than for straightforward dealing. It would seem that Iying and servility are natural in the attitude of a subject toward a master， that is toward a superior but uncomprehending power； while truth is generated in sympathy.
Tyranny may be said to make falsehood a virtue， and in contemporary Russia， for instance， stealth and evasion are the necessary and justifiable means of pursuing the aims of human nature.
Another reason for the association of freedom with truth is that the former is a training in the sense of social cause and effect； the free play of human forces being a constant demonstration of the power of reality as against sham. The more men experiment intelligently with life， the more they come to believe in definite causation and the less in trickery. Freedom means continuous experiment， a constant testing of the individual and of all kinds of social ideas and arrangements. It tends， then， to a social realism； "Her open eyes desire the truth." The best people I know are pervaded by the feeling that life is so real that it is not worth while to make believe. "Knights of the unshielded heart，" they desire nothing so much as to escape from all pretense and prudery and confront things as they really are梒onfident that they are not irremediably bad. I read in a current newspaper that (184) "brutal， unvarnished， careless frankness is the pose of the new type of girl. She has not been developed in a school of evasion. To pretend you gave a hundred dollars for a gown when you really gave fifty for it， is a sorry jest for her and a waste of time.... If she owns to the new gown she tells you its cost， the name of the inexpensive dressmaker who made it， and just where she economized in its price."There is a tribute to truth in the very cynicism and shamelessness with which flagitious politicians and financiers declare and defend their practices.
Like Napoleon or Macchiavelli they have at least cast off superstition and are dealing with reality， though they apprehend it only in a low and partial aspect. If they lie， they do so deliberately， scientifically， with a view to producing a certain effect upon people whom they regard as fools.