Some years ago， for instance， occurred a national election in which the main issue was whether silver should or should not be coined freely at a rate much above its bullion value. Two facts were impressed upon the observer of this campaign： first， the inability of most men， even of education， to reason clearly on a somewhat abstract question Iying outside of their daily experience， and， second， the sound instinct which all sorts of people showed in choosing sides through leadership. The flow of nonsense (143) on both parts was remarkable， but personality was the determining influence. It was common to hear men say that they should vote for or against the proposition because they did or did not trust its conspicuous advocates；and it was evident that many were controlled in this way who did not acknowledge it， even to themselves. The general result was that the more conservative men were united on one side， and the more radical and shifting elements on the other.
The real interest of the voter at our elections is usually in personality.
One likes or dislikes A， who is running for alderman， and votes accordingly， without knowing or caring what he is likely to do if elected. Or one opposes B， because he is believed to be in league with the obnoxious C， and so on. It is next to impossible to get a large or intelligent vote on an impersonal matter， such as the constitutional amendments which， in most of our states， have to be submitted to the people. The newspapers， reflecting the public taste， say little about them， and the ordinary voter learns of them for the first time when he comes to the polls. Only a measure which directly affects the interests or passions of the people， like prohibition of the liquor traffic， will call out a large vote.
On this shrewd judgment of persons the advocate of democracy chiefly grounds his faith that the people will be right in the long run. The old argument against him runs as follows： democracy is the rule of the many；the many are incompetent to understand public questions； hence democracy is the rule of incompetence. Thus Macauley held that institutions purely democratic must (144) sooner or later destroy liberty or civilization or both； and expected a day of spoliation in the United States， "for with you the majority is the government and has the rich absolutely at its mercy." [13] More recent writers of standing have taken the same view， like Lecky， who declares that the rule of the majority is the rule of ignorance， since the poor and the ignorant are the largest proportion of the population. [14]
To this our democrat will answer， "The many， whether rich or poor， are incompetent to grasp the truth in its abstractness， but they reach it through personal symbols， they feel their way by sympathy， and their conclusions are at least as apt to be right as those of any artificially selected class."And he will perhaps turn to American history， which is， on the whole， a fairly convincing demonstration that the masses are not incapable of temperate and wise decision， even on matters of much difficulty. That our antecedents and training have been peculiarly fortunate must be conceded.
The crudely pessimistic view is superficial not only in underestimating the masses and overestimating wealth？which is， in our times at least， almost the only possible basis of a privileged class梑ut in failing to understand the organic character of a mature public judgment. Is it not a rather obvious fallacy to say that because the ignorant outnumber the educated， therefore the rule of the majority is the rule of ignorance？
If fifty men consult (145) together， forty of whom are ignorant regarding the matter in hand and ten informed， will their conclusions necessarily be those of ignorance？
Evidently not， unless in some improbable manner the forty separate from the ten and refuse to be guided by them. Savages and gangs of boys on the street choose the most sagacious to lead in counsel， and even pirates will put the best navigators in charge of the ship. The natural thing， as we have seen， is for a group to defer to its most competent members. Lecky would himself have maintained this in the case of Parliament， and why should it not be true of other groups ？ I see no reason why the rule of the majority should be the rule of ignorance， unless they are not only ignorant but fools； and I do not suppose the common people of any capable race are that.
I was born and have lived nearly all my life in the shadow of an institution of higher learning， a university， supported out of the taxes of a democratic state and governed by a board elected directly by the people. So far back as I can remember there have not been wanting pessimists to say that the institution could not prosper on such a basis. "What，" they said， "do the farmers know or care about the university？ how can we expect that they should support astronomy and Sanscrit and the higher mathematics ？ " In fact there have been troublous times， especially in the earlier days， but the higher learning has steadily won its way in open discussion， and the university is now far larger， higher in its standards， better supported and apparently more firmly established in popular approval than ever before.
What more exacting test of the power of democracy to pursue and effectuate (146) high and rather abstract ideals could there well be than this ？ One who lives in the midst of such facts cannot but discover something rather doctrinaire in the views of Macaulay and Lecky.